Conclusion

“Art is a product of human creativity that is not determined by any other motives than that of the creative act itself.”

There it is, once again. The definition of art; the shortest possible summary of the understanding of art that has been introduced, discussed and put to practical use throughout the five chapters of this thesis.

It was introduced in the first chapter, where its linearity was underlined: A – a natural ability and subsequent urge in human beings – leads to B – the production of art. The circularity of Dickie’s theory was avoided, and a revision of the importance of the cultural context was made: Art is not merely a cultural phenomenon – it is a naturally occurring one, but one that can never exist outside a cultural context. So, although any instance of art is always tied to the culture it is part of, this understanding shifts the perspective from being only on the cultural context to being on how a naturally occurring phenomenon is construed in a given culture. The chapter also focused on why art at all should be defined – stating, above all, that the recognition of the existence of a phenomenon is enough of a reason to examine it – and what could be said to be the point of art – stating that the only overall point is that of stimulating the mind of whomever that could not help but make it.

The second chapter focused on Dickie’s theory and its postulate that the institution is a sine qua non for art, rather than the other way around, which is the view held in this thesis. Everyone of the five parts that make up Dickie’s theory of art were discussed in an attempt to highlight their shortcomings, in spite of a great overlap in the understanding of “art” as a non-evaluative term. A great majority of the instances that would be labelled art according to the definition given in this thesis would also be labelled art according to Dickie’s theory, but it is that minority and the overall understanding of art that were of main interest in this discussion. Finally, the chapter discussed two criticisms of Dickie’s theory put forward by Favrholdt, leading to a defence of Dickie on both points: Favrholdt claims that Dickie’s theory does not allow a discussion of good and bad art, but that is exactly what it does – with the notion that “bad art” is still art, since “art” is not an evaluative term. Favrholdt also criticises the statement that “everything can be art”, which, however, appears to be read by Favrholdt as if “everything is art” – which it of course is not.

In the third chapter, the reception of art was discussed, and great emphasis was placed upon the concept of intentionality, since it is essentially through this that it becomes possible to determine whether a given instance is art or not. It was pointed out that, since intentionality is not possible to observe directly, it must be accepted that there are cases when no one will ever know for certain what the intentionality behind a given instance was, thereby forcing analyses to rely on common sense, logic and probability. The limitations and how they affect the reception of art were discussed, pointing out that, although an analysis of art will never be definite, it can still bring forth an understanding of a given piece within a given context. The “intentional fallacy” – the argument put forth by Beardsley and Wimsatt – was discussed, and Kjørup’s argument that the fallacy is only one such under a certain view of art was agreed to. Further discussions followed, underlining the importance of taking intentionality into account. The general reception process was explained through hermeneutics – that any piece of art can only be understood the recipient’s existing understanding of the world, and that the latter will be revised through the encounter with the piece of art. A reception is thus understood as a form of interpretation, and a judgment is understood as the emergence of an awareness of how something corresponds with one’s taste. Although it is accepted that a judgment basically is positive, negative or indifferent, the complexities of judgments were discussed in an attempt to highlight how those terms easily get clouded and how a strict border between what is considered “good” and “bad” art is unlikely to exist in anyone. Also, the problems with having art as an evaluative term were discussed along with the actual, practical reception and judgment of art.

The fourth chapter focused on the challenges of art – picking up discussions that previous thinkers within the field have dealt with, above all Dickie. The first one was Duchamp’s Fountain, which is regarded as art, because it represents an idea and an execution of it. Duchamp’s Bicycle Wheel was also discussed and labelled art, although Duchamp has directly stated that he did not “want to make a work of art out of it”. Danto’s term “indistinguishables” was also touched upon, as was the discussion of whether or not a mountain range or a piece of driftwood can be art – and whether they can become so simply through the act of titling – and it was stated that they can, since everything can be art, but that such instances of art are likely to disposed of through what is considered the self-regulation of the institution of art. Also, animal art was discussed, not to determine once and for all whether animals are able to produce art, but to shift focus away from Dickie’s approach where art status is achieved through someone from the institution conferring that status upon what an animal has produced – and to an approach that examines the aesthetic awareness of animals. Finally, the concept of artifactuality was discussed, and the use of the term “artifact” in relation to art was considered unhelpful, since its connotations – that instances of art are physical things – limit the understanding of art. Instead, “instance” was labelled a sufficient term.

The fifth chapter analysed and discussed the art status of a variety of instances that have been labelled art, covering art projects, performance art, concept art, portrait paintings, glass art, album sleeves, a fictional story spanning over 15,000 pages, and photography art. The gathered knowledge was put to use, and the definition was shown in effect, used to briefly analyse a wide selection of instances.

What is considered to be the most controversial point throughout the five chapters is the stripping of the status of art from Rembrandt’s commissioned portraits. This sole peak beyond the year 1750 was deliberately made because it strongly highlights the core of the understanding of art in this thesis: That when creativity is directly motivated by monetary gain – or anything else other than the creative act itself – then it is not art.

Separating pieces like these from those that actually are art helps in terms of seeing things in their proper light. It is considered of great importance in the understanding of, say, a painting if it was created strictly out of the urge to paint it, or if it is the painter putting his skills to use so that he can make money. Arguing against this separation is to blur the understanding of the paintings.

If Rembrandt’s commissioned portraits are art, then so is the current-day photographic advertisement: The photographer has put his skills to use, much in the same way as Rembrandt, to create a result that might be considered to be of high aesthetic quality by someone – not to satisfy the creative urge of himself, but the demands of a client – and, of course, his urge to get a monetary reward.

An argument here might be that what makes Rembrandt’s portraits art is the fact that his personal style is visible in them – but this holds true for photographers, too, although not always as visibly so, perhaps in particular with less experienced ones. Nonetheless, the control of all the parameters of photographer – shutter time, aperture, angle, lighting, focal width, white balance, post-production and so forth – certainly leaves plenty of room for a personal style to emerge. Also, this personal style is likely to be what attracts clients – they are not just getting a somewhat plain image; they are getting one with the distinctive style of Rembrandt – or that of a given photographer.

The argument might be phrased like this: Since a personal style is visible in the paintings, Rembrandt’s motivation to create them must be linked to his creative urge, not just his urge to make money. This is true; there is indeed such a link. But this constellation is a reversal of the situation where a person makes art out of his creative urge to do so – but with awareness that he might be able to sell the result. It is still art, because what determined the creative act was the urge to make art, not to make money. When it comes to Rembrandt’s portraits, it seems unlikely that he would have made them, had he not been paid to do so – so what determined the creative act was the urge to make money – but with awareness that he still gets to have some amount of creative freedom, which makes the job more appealing than if he was not allowed to have any freedom at all.

It should be pointed out that removing the status of art from the portraits is not done with any other motivation than trying to achieve the best possible understanding of what is art and what is not. That the portraits are not considered art does not mean that they lose any aesthetic value – or any other kind of value as such – just as the fact that something is art does not automatically make it interesting. The portraits are simply not art, but commissioned portraits – and potentially magnificent ones at that.

Also, the terminology surrounding the portraits does not automatically get shattered, simply because they are not art: They are still paintings – even “works by Rembrandt” – and they can still be praised for their technical and aesthetic qualities – or criticised for their lack of such qualities, if that is one’s opinion – just as they can be as indicative of Rembrandt’s personality as any piece of art he made.

Additionally, it is not to be considered improper here to show the portraits in an art museum in the context of pieces of art by the same painter, since they are all paintings, and together they make a form of narrative about the painter. Ideally, of course, it should be pointed out that they are commissioned paintings, so that the difference between the two categories is made apparent, ensuring that the audience is aware of it. What would be considered improper would be to have an exhibition solely consisting of commissioned portraits in an art museum, presenting them as art and creating a discourse of art around them, instead of presenting them as paintings whose creation was determined by the urge of the person who made them to make money.

Again – the portraits are not spoken of derogatively here. An exhibition – though preferably not in an art museum – of 20th century advertisements has a great potential to be of interest to many people – and to be considered impressive in all sorts of ways – aesthetically, technically, historically, and so forth. But the advertisements are not art and do not become art simply by being exhibited, not even in an art museum.

Removing the art status from an abundance of pieces – Rembrandt is obviously only one single example of someone who made commissioned paintings – that are considered art in art history books and by the museums whose walls and rooms feature the pieces leads to the natural consequence that any history of art must be reconsidered; the consequence that is logically tied together with any new understanding of art. The argument that it would be hard to do so is not a valid one; that one has had an incorrect understanding of something for a long time is no excuse not to revise that understanding.

Looking at the overall development of the concept of art within Western societies¹¹⁷, a general tendency reveals itself that is in accordance with the understanding of art introduced in this thesis. When categories have been excluded – such as architecture, geometry, grammar and natural sciences – they are generally the ones that are contrary to the definition given here; they are dependent on the human ability to be creative, but not directly attached to the urge to be so. Increased focus on the individual, particularly in the 18th century, also aligns itself with the understanding given here, as do the autonomy of art and the general understanding of art in the 20th century, all of which have contributed to a clarification of the understanding of human creativity and an expansion of the field of art, ridding it of the previously required connection between art and beauty.

Along with these came the institution of art, however, which has wrongfully been considered, as has been pointed out several times, a sine qua non for art, instead of, as would have been correct, the other way around. The institution has historically proved itself useful in arguments about whether certain pieces were art or not – Fountain, not least – but, as is the overall claim in this thesis, it is entirely possible to understand a piece of art without an institutional context – that is, if there even is one attached to the given piece.

In either case, the origin of art – why humans make art at all – is more appropriately understood without an institutional context: It is at this point that the very nature of art can potentially be grasped, allowing a solid foundation for a fuller understanding of the cultural context that any instance of art will be part of.

A major point must be made here: Although the goal has been to define “art”, the term has not been defined ultimately. What has taken place over the past eighty pages or so is the localisation, examination and discussion of a phenomenon that exists outside any academic discourse or methodology. “Art” is, when it comes down to it, merely a somewhat arbitrary, culturally constructed term that has been attributed to this phenomenon.

A frequent discussion in this thesis has been that of the connotations of terms – “artist”, “artwork”, “purity”, “genius”, “reception”, “interpretation”, “artifact” and “arrangement” – and seeing as how “art” definitely has connotations that have the term be an evaluative one, in some everyday usage and according to Tilghman and Gardner, one could argue that “art” is altogether an “unhelpful term”, to paraphrase previous discussions of connotations. The consequence, then, would be to replace the term with a more helpful one. “Urge-determined creativity” might be one such that is in accordance with the definition given in this thesis, and one that would allow the discussion of the given phenomenon without talking about “art” at all.

When “art” has nonetheless been used as the central term – the one that has been sought to be understood in the best way possible – it is with the recognition that using the term at all is adhering to a cultural construction of what art is. A continued awareness of this has, however, been exercised so as to ensure that what has been discussed is first and foremost the phenomenon, which the term “art” designates in this thesis, rather than any cultural construction.

It is, though, only because of the overlaps in the understandings of art – those of Dickie, Davies, Danto, de Duve, Duchamp, Favrholdt, Beardsley, Goodman and so forth – that it is at all possible to have meaningful discussions of the topic of art. Discussions that are believed to become more meaningful when the same term is used by those involved, rather than having everyone come up with their own term, which is why “urge-determined creativity” has not been used instead of “art”; the overall clarity would have suffered.

Regarding the arbitrariness of the term “art”, one could insist on having it be an evaluative term, though that would, as has been pointed out, lead to semantic gaps, and what would be defined would not be the phenomenon that has been dealt with in this thesis. Similarly, one could insist on “art” being a term that describes only certain activities – say, traditional art forms – yet by disconnecting the term from other activities with similar motivations, the overall understanding of “art” in such a context would be restricted. It would allow Rembrandt’s commissioned paintings to be art, but there would be no thorough logic to separate them from current-day advertisements.

What is considered a main achievement of this thesis is the avoidance of evaluative discussions of actual instances of art. Although a psychological reading of the thesis might reveal plenty of things about its author, it is considered important that emotional outbursts about actual instances have not occurred – pointing to Beardsley’s discussion of Fountain and Favrholdt’s ditto of provocative art in general as two of the most obvious examples of such outbursts. The emotional detachment from the given field is hoped to provide credibility to the overall project, as well as ensuring that disagreements with the understanding presented in the thesis are with the understanding itself rather than its methodology, to the extent that the two can be separated.

There is recognition that plenty of definitions and understandings of art exist, including many that have not been dealt with in this thesis, and there is a desire to discuss every single one of these. Given the scope of the thesis, limitations had to be set, though, and there is hope that the discussions that were included will implicitly reveal what general positions would be taken towards those that were not.

Such were the words with which clarity has been sought to be achieved. Speaking clearly about the phenomenon labelled “art” has been the goal, and when topics whereof one cannot speak have been in the vicinity of already written words, silence has been exercised to the extent it has been possible.