Introduction

“What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent.”¹

Ludwig Wittgenstein coined this highly quotable phrase, and once it was introduced to this author in class several years ago, it stuck. The thought that ideas, concepts and theories generally fall into these two categories rang true, and it has been applied to all academic papers ever since, directly or indirectly. When professors, philosophers and other thinkers within human sciences have uttered theories that have sounded unnecessarily complex, it seems as if they, indeed, were; as if ground that could not be covered was attempted to be covered anyhow. And, at the same time, when the metaphorical light bulbs lit up the brightest, the feeling was that it was because the same group of people hit upon that, which can indeed be said – and managed to do so clearly.

The latter experience has naturally been had quite a few times over the past years, while the former has been particularly dominant within the field of art, and specifically in discussions of the definition of art. Theorists within this field seem so passionate and tangled up in personal views of what art should be that discussions tend to get clouded, unproductive and unnecessarily complex, especially when trying to defend a normative view on art as if it was a descriptive one.

Similarly, the view that no definition at all is necessary makes things unnecessarily complex, simply by stating that a very apparent phenomenon – whose existence everyone agrees on – needs no closer examination than what is possible on a case-by-case basis. Without an understanding of what somehow connects all the instances of this phenomenon, the phenomenon itself will never be fully understood. That, at least, is the claim here, and being a student of art and never having been offered a satisfying definition of art serves as a great motivator in writing this thesis.

The thinking documented in the thesis has taken place over the course of eight semesters and is essentially a continuation of a project begun in the fall of 2005, when this author’s first attempt at defining art was made – in a paper that received some amount of praise, above all for the courage it bore witness to. Nevertheless, “I would be made a fool of if I stood up before an audience of my peers and told them, ‘the definition of art is...’,” were among the words in the accompanying criticism of the paper provided by the grading professor afterwards, which, perhaps peculiarly, ensured motivation to continue work on a definition. The work did continue, both by frequently bringing up the topic in student presentations, by discussing the topic with whoever was willing – academics and non-academics alike – and by ensuring that three additional exams were used to test out the concepts and thoughts behind the definition. Upon hearing a presentation about conventions of art, another professor uttered the words, “you’re crazy!”, though adding “...in a good way”, again ensuring continued motivation. If one is indeed crazy and even a possible target of ridicule for discussing these topics, it could either be that it is an impossible endeavour, or that it is indeed a possible one, but one that has led so many others to failure. Two sides of the same coin, perhaps, but this thesis bears testimony to a belief in the latter.

In the attempt to reach the point that seemingly everyone else has failed to reach, the goal of this thesis becomes to eliminate, on one hand, evaluative definitions and, on the other, more or less rigid definitions of art, and instead introduce an understanding of art that has the potential to create agreement across boundaries of taste and thus shift focus to the creation of a framework for the evaluative discussion of art – without thereby giving any evaluation of any pieces of art at all.

A brief historical placement of the perspective on art discussed in this thesis can be given by summarizing the overall discussion in the following way. A shift happened with modern art that changed the statement “This is beauty” to “This is art”², illustrating the acknowledgement that art was no longer merely an examination of the concept of beauty, but rather a much more complex phenomenon whose boundaries need to be examined. Realizing that this examination is by no means over, there is also the acknowledgement that, as it is often phrased, “everything can be art”. With art not being an evaluative term, as it will be argued here that it is not, a third, and perhaps seemingly paradox – although it is not – version of the statement becomes “This is good art”. It is of great importance, however, to note that no academic theory of any kind will ever be able to determine this, since it relies entirely on a strictly subjective taste. Thus, the academic accomplishment becomes not to answer the question of what good art is, but rather to ensure that it is the question that is being asked. This is what is meant by creating a framework for the evaluative discussion of art without actually giving any evaluation of any pieces of art in doing so.

Inherent in the question “What is good art?” lies the implication that there is an agreement as to what art is. So to reach the point of asking the question of what good art is, it is necessary to answer the question of what art is. And that is, naturally, what a main focus of this thesis will be. Part of the answer has already been revealed; that art as a term is not an evaluative one, but that the instances within it – pieces of art – are indeed evaluable, or else the concept of “good art” would make no sense: Either it would be a pleonasm, where “good” describes something that is by definition good (accepting that when “art” has been used as an evaluative term it is generally used in a positive sense), or it would classify something as being “good” that could not be classified as such, if its instances were not evaluable.

The reason for insisting that art is not an evaluative term is two-fold. First of all, the general use – be it by the general public or certain academics (of which David Favrholdt is a prime example) – of art in the evaluative sense per definition promotes certain attributes of art and thereby becomes an often incoherent answer of, indeed, “What is good art?”, rather than “What is art?”. Second of all, there are no general, non-evaluative terms that have managed to sum up what exactly those instances are that are not art because they did not meet the given requirements. Attempts either include the word “art” along with a negation of some sort – like “art-falsely-so-called” or “works of failed art”³ – or are simply evaluative in a negative sense (“trash” or “crap” would be two popular versions of such terms). Neither properly fill the semantic void left by the evaluative use of “art”. That they serve a purpose in everyday conversations of art has limited interest in an academic context, especially one where the goal is to define art. Being able to eliminate statements such as “it’s too ugly to be art”, “everyone could do that, so it’s not art” and “not enough effort has been put into it for it to be art” in favour of ones that explain why the given piece is bad art – and thereby not questioning the art status – would be a major achievement.

The main goal of the discussions presented in this thesis is to give a clear overall understanding of what art is, with emphasis on overall. As opposed to most other definitions of art, this thesis will celebrate grey areas – in the sense that there is plenty of room for any piece of art that situates itself on the border of that, which is art, and that, which is not. Discussions of such cases are believed, not to be something that should rigidly be discarded as “definitely art” or “definitely not art”, but rather to positively challenge the perspective on what art can also be, without thereby changing the fundamental understanding of what art is. It is, potentially, an instance that might expand the perspective on art, though it might as well be classified as something else, say, an advertisement of sorts, to use an example of something that tends to be confused with art every so often. On a case-by-case basis, then, it is fully expected that an instance can be hard to classify, but this is seen as a good thing, seeing as how it helps keep discussions of art vital, even if it does not lead to changes in the understanding of what art is overall. Then again, most passionate art discussions seem to have been sparked by the fascination of or, perhaps more often, distaste for exactly singular instances of art – the works of Duchamp and Warhol being obvious examples hereof – as opposed to stand-alone epiphanies of what art is on a general level.

This thesis represents what could be called a certain academic temper. It follows the tradition of academic discourse, but somewhat unorthodoxly so. There is no urge as such to co-align a set of thinkers merely for the sake of exercising the ability to do so. Not every single thinker from past centuries that could have been included is to be found here, as it is believed that thoroughly constructive points can be made without doing so. Additionally, no attempts have been made to bow down to the older and wiser. There is full realization that the author of this thesis is generally inferior when it comes to historic and academic knowledge and experience when compared to the theorists included in the discussions. There is, perhaps, some unintended arrogance in discussing one-on-one with, say, Dickie who has spent over half a century pondering these things. But this very approach is believed to have the potential of bringing forth observations of some originality, thus justifying the approach itself. The aforementioned temper, then, is one that does not cope well with tedious traditions, but thrives on dynamic discourse. The overall goal of this academic approach is then not to show off the ability to juggle as many difficult theories at once as possible, but to supply and inspire new ways of understanding – or at least discussing – the given field.

The choice of discussion partners and ways of carrying out discussions will reveal that much is owed to the tradition of analytic philosophy. The chosen theory and methodology is based on this tradition, which is revealed through the discussions of the central terms of the field that most of the thesis consists of. Discussing the definition of art is believed to be, essentially, a battle of words, making it crucial that these words are carefully chosen, discussed and understood. Also, the tradition should reveal itself through the emphasis on posing as clear arguments as possible. These are the core methodological principles of the analytic tradition, which also makes up the core of this thesis. Additional theory – again with Favrholdt as an example – is included, but such is dealt with by the same principles, ensuring that the methodology is as consistent as possible throughout the thesis.

A dominant figure will be George Dickie, whose theories and ideas will be discussed throughout the thesis. The reason for this is above all a strongly ambivalent connection with his Institutional Theory of Art: On one hand, there is very little difference between which instances would be classified as art in his theory and the one that will be presented in this thesis, and highly central agreement on art not being an evaluative term exists, too. On the other, it is believed that the very basis of Dickie’s theory – the institution of art – limits the understanding of art, since the institution is not believed to be essential for the existence of art. That, of course, has a major impact on the view of his theory, in spite of the other points of agreement. What needs a revision is not as often which instances are classified as art, but rather why they are classified as being such.

Also, a lot is also owed to the work of Charles Darwin. There should be no doubt that this thesis belongs under human sciences, but great inspiration has been found in the rather simple principles that make up the core of evolutionary biology; a prime example of how that which can be said can be said clearly. It is indeed rooted in these principles that this thesis has its starting point, revealed already in the very title of the first chapter.

It deals with the origin of art and presents a definition of art based on a Darwinian understanding of the creative urges and abilities of human beings. Before that, it discusses why art at all should be defined, and the chapter ends with a discussion of what the point of art could be said to be.

The second chapter focuses on the institution of art, with much emphasis on Dickie’s theory. The chapter seeks to point out why the institution of art is not necessary in order to define art, which is Dickie’s central claim.

The third chapter shifts the primary focus from the creation of art to the reception and subsequent judgment of art. A transitional discussion of the concept of intentionality starts off the chapter.

The fourth chapter deals with a series of topics that have previously been considered challenging to definitions of art. These topics include readymades, found art, titling, animal art and the concept of artifactuality.

The fifth chapter puts the knowledge gathered in the previous four chapters to use in a series of brief analyses of actual instances that have been labelled art, juxtaposing them with the definition of art given in the first chapter, determining their status of art as well as possible.

Forgiveness must be asked, since there are no rigid divisions between all the discussed topics in this thesis. It would be nice if it was possible to strictly discuss one topic at a time, but it is the very nature of the field that its topics are so strongly intertwined. That said, efforts have obviously been made to make the chapter-based divisions as meaningful as possible.

Proceed to Chapter 1: The Origin of Art